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Abstract 
Survey research has steadily expanded in the Arab world since the 1980s. The Arab spring 
marked a watershed when surveying became possible in Tunisia and Libya, and 
questionnaires included previously censured questions. Almost every Arab country is now 
included in the Arab Barometer or World Values Survey and researchers have numerous 
datasets to answer theoretical and policy questions. Yet some scholars express the view that 
the Arab survey context is more challenging than other regions or that respondents will not 
answer honestly. I argue that this reflects biases of “Arab exceptionalism,” more than fair 
assessments of data quality. Based on cross-national data analysis, I find evidence of 
systematically missing data—a possible indicator of social desirability bias—in all regions 
and political regimes. These challenges and the increasing openness of some Arab countries 
to survey research should spur studies on the data collection process in the Arab world and 
beyond. 
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Introduction 
Survey research has expanded dramatically in the Arab world since the late 1980s.i 
Implemented first in authoritarian regimes undergoing political liberalization—including 
Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and prior to the Arab spring in Egypt—
these studies, conducted as part of the World Values Survey (WVS) and Arab Barometer by 
Mark Tessler, Mustapha Hamarneh, Amaney Jamal, Mansoor Moaddel, Khalil Shikaki, and 
others, broke new ground. During the 2000s, a few Gulf countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Qatar—were added, and a regional survey research hub, the Social and Economic Survey 
Research Institute (SESRI), was established in Qatar, joining similar institutes in Palestine 
and Jordan (Appendix Table A1).ii At the same time, the growing body of surveys left many 
theoretical and policy questions unanswered. Due to their sensitivity, questions on voter 
choice and support for Islamist movements were not included in early questionnaires. Yet, 
over time, additional countries and topics were added. On the eve of the Arab spring, a total 
of at least 30 surveys had been fielded in thirteen Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran—up from 
2 in 1988 (Figure 1).  
[Figure 1]  
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Figure 1. Growth of surveys in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows survey research in the MENA, based on the Carnegie Middle East 
Governance and Islam Dataset (Tessler 2016), which includes 56 surveys and more than 
80,000 interviews. 
 
Yet, the Arab spring marked a watershed for survey research, dramatically 
accelerating data collection and offering a suitable opportunity to reflect on past successes 
and future potential. Surveys were conducted for the first time in Tunisia and Libya following 
their 2011 uprisings. Due to its political openness and expanding survey capacity, Tunisia 
became rich terrain for social scientists as it transitioned to a minimalist democracy. 
Countries such as Morocco and Jordan experienced limited political reform, but public 
opinion reacted to regional events there as well. Support for democracy declined in several 
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countries (Benstead and Snyder 2017), and attitudes toward foreign policy issues shifted in 
theoretically interesting ways as well (Benstead 2017b).  
In some cases, opportunities to conduct surveys were fleeting. Egypt returned to 
authoritarian rule and Libya’s civil war continued, making survey research difficult, due to 
instability. In addition, although the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer have not been 
conducted in Syria, many scholars and organizations are conducting surveys in Syria and 
among displaced Syrians.iii  
Yet, dozens of datasets exist. As shown in Table 1, almost every Arab country is 
included in the WVS, Afrobarometer, and Arab Barometer (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, 
Jamal, and Robbins 2012). In addition, survey research conducted by the Transitional 
Governance Project (TGP 2017),iv the Program on Governance and Local Development 
(GLD 2017),v and other researchers and projects has also increased.  
[Table 1]  
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Table 1. Nationally-representative surveys in the Arab world 
 World Values Survey Arab Barometer 
(Wave) 
Afro 
Barometer 
 
Constituent 
Survey & 
Transitional 
Governance 
Project (TGP) 
 
Progra
m on 
Govern
ance 
and 
Local 
Develo
pment 
(GLD) 
 
Morocco 
 
2001/2007/2011 2006 (1)/2013-
2014 (3) 
2013 2007  
Algeria 2002/2013 2006 (1)/2011 
(2)/2013 (3) 
2013 2007  
Tunisia 2013 2011 (2)/2013 (3) 2013 2012/2014 2015 
Libya 2014 2014 (3) 2013 2013  
Egypt 2001/2008/2013 2011 (2)/2013 (3)  2011/2012  
Jordan 2001/2007/2014 2006 (1)/2010 
(2)/2012-2013 (3) 
  2014 
Iraq 2004/2006/2012 2011 (2)/2013 (3)    
Syria      
Palestinian 
Territories 
2013 2006 (1)/2010 
(2)/2012 (3) 
   
Lebanon 2013 2007 (1)/2011 
(2)/2013 (3) 
   
Kuwait 2014 2014 (3)    
Qatar 2010     
United Arab 
Emirates 
     
Bahrain 2014 2009 (1)1    
Oman      
Saudi Arabia 2003 2011 (2)    
Yemen 2014 2007 (1)/2011 
(2)/2013 (3) 
   
Sudan  2010-2011 
(2)/2013 (3) 
2013   
1500 respondents (Tessler 2016). Appendix Table A1. 
 
Interest in survey research is also increasing among Middle East political scientists. 
As shown in Figure 2, the number of papers presented at Middle East Studies Association 
(MESA) annual meetings using survey data increased from 12 (2009) to 33 (2016)—by 
almost three times—while presentations at the American Political Science Association 
(APSA) annual meeting grew from 1 (2009) to 10 (2016). These include survey experiments, 
which combine probability sampling with random assignment, and vary photos, question 
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wording, and frames (Benstead, Jamal, and Lust 2015; Bush and Jamal 2015; Bush and 
Prather Forthcoming; Corstange and Marinov 2012; Nugent, Masoud, and Jamal 2016; Shelef 
and Zeira 2015). 
[Figure 2]  
Figure 2. MESA (left) and APSA (right) presentations 
 
  
 
Figure 2 (left) shows papers presented at MESA annual meetings, based on a search for 
“survey” in abstracts, where the term refers to opinion rather than archival or qualitative 
surveys. Figure 2 (right) shows papers and posters presented at APSA based on titles. 
(Appendix Table A2). 
 
At the same time, the range of topics has also expanded to include transitional politics 
in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Among the questions scholars can explore include:vi  
1. Why did citizens participate in the uprisings? (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015) 
2. How do regimes reconsolidate after transitions? Are the same voters engaged before 
and after revolutions?  
3. What explains support for Islamist and non-Islamist parties? (Pellicer and Wegner 
2015) 
4. To what extent does vote-buying occur? Why do citizens respond to clientelistic and 
programmatic appeals? 
5. Why do Arab citizens vary in their support for a two-state solution in Israel/Palestine? 
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6. Why do citizens support globalization, trade, and foreign direct investment? How do 
citizens respond to western interference in internal politics? (Nugent, Masoud, and 
Jamal 2016). 
 
In order to expand existing research and answer these questions, it is important to 
address concerns raised by some conference participants and reviewers about data quality in 
the Arab world. These concerns stem from the threat of preference falsification in 
authoritarian regimes (Kuran 1997), and, to a lesser extent and largely anecdotally, from 
worries about the difficult survey environment, due to political instability in some 
countries.vii Yet, based on analyses of existing cross-national datasets, I find evidence of 
systematically missing data—a possible indicator of social desirability bias—in Arab cases, 
but in other regions as well. I argue that worries that the Arab world is a more challenging 
survey context—or that citizens answer dishonestly—reflect biases of “Arab 
exceptionalism,” more than fair assessments of data quality. These challenges should spur 
methodological research to understand the data collection process. This paper discusses Arab 
survey context, including the impact of authoritarianism on data quality, and highlights 
ethical issues arising from Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI), one of several 
tools to study and address bias. 
The Arab Survey Context 
A growing literature focuses on how observable interviewer traits, including religious 
dress and gender, and the apparent research sponsor, affect participation and responses in the 
Arab world (Blaydes and Gillum 2013; Corstange 2014). This research shows that social 
desirability bias is at least as pronounced in the Middle East as in other regions, due to the 
politicization of issues like religion and women’s rights. For instance, female interviewers 
receive more egalitarian responses to questions about gender equality in the U.S. and Mexico 
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(Kane and Macaulay 1993; Flores-Macias and Lawson 2008), but effects are large and 
interact with interviewer religious dress and respondent traits in the Arab countries (Benstead 
2014a, b; Blaydes and Gillum 2013).  
Yet, while the nature and magnitude of interviewer effects vary cross-regionally, 
social desirability impacts survey data in all world regions (Flores-Macias and Lawson 2008; 
Sudman and Bradburn 1974; Gmel and Heeb 2001; Streb et al. 2008). So too, instability, 
poor infrastructure (e.g., electricity), and difficulties drawing a representative sample are 
challenges in many Arab countries, just as they are in other international contexts (Seligson 
and Morales 2017).  
Importantly, authoritarianism in many Arab countries also raises concerns about 
whether respondents will answer honestly (Kuran 1997).viii In authoritarian regimes, citizens 
may feel compelled to participate in surveys and, when answering, conceal their opinions for 
fear of retaliation or a loss of benefits if they do not support the regime. Moreover, concerns 
about preference falsification do not disappear in democratic transitions. In a polarizing 
transition such as Tunisia’s, respondents may no longer fear criticizing the authoritarian 
regime, but they may hesitate to admit that they did not vote for the governing party 
(Benstead and Malouche 2015). 
Concerns about preference falsification in authoritarian survey contexts appear to be 
widespread among political scientists. For instance, one anonymous reviewer wrote in 2017 
about a manuscript that used Gallup data from several Arab countries, in including Tunisia, 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Bahrain:  
 
“The study is based on survey data, collected two years prior to the uprisings, from 
citizens who live under authoritarian regimes with no freedom of expression and hefty 
penalties for speaking up. Therefore, I don't believe that the people surveyed were 
telling the truth with no fear of retribution from the government given the abundant 
number of informants lurking everywhere.”  
 
10 
 
 
Yet, preference falsification is not limited to the Arab region. Studies in authoritarian 
regimes, including Russia (Kalinin 1996), China (Jiang and Yang 2016), and Africa 
(Tannenberg 2017), find that respondents misrepresent their views on sensitive issues (Kuran 
1997). It is therefore critical to conduct methodological research to understand when and why 
social desirability shapes participation and responses. Rather than avoiding survey research, 
scholars should employ list experiments, interviewer effects studies, or mode studies to 
understand where and why preference falsification occurs. 
Despite these concerns, research on preference falsification in the Arab world has 
looked only obliquely at the phenomenon and found mixed results. In transitional Tunisia, 
Bush and Prather (2017) found that opposition members did not report more favourable 
views of the majority party, Ennahda, when the enumerator used CAPI rather than PAPI, 
even though tablets may induce fears of surveillance. So too, Bush, Erlich, Prather, and Zeira 
(2016) find no effect of authoritarian iconography on compliance or support for the regime in 
an experiment in the United Arab Emirates. However, interviewer effects studies suggest 
possible preference falsification in Morocco and Tunisia, where secular-appearing male 
interviewers, who are more likely to be associated with the state, received higher 
participation and lower item non-response rates (Benstead 2014a, b; Benstead and Malouche 
2015).  
Data Quality Assessment 
Comparison of response distributions across surveys conducted at similar times and 
an examination of missing data provides a reasonable, if not wholly satisfying approach to 
assessing data quality. Poor feedback and probing, mistakes in questionnaire application 
(such as skip patterns), and imprecise response recording all lead to missing data and can 
produce inefficiency and bias in statistical analyses. Missing data also stems from question 
sensitivity and indicates social desirability or conformity bias.ix 
11 
 
 
Yet, in an analysis of missing data, the Arab world does not stand out dramatically 
from other regions in terms of the amount of missing data or the extent to which it is related 
to independent variables which are correlated with many outcomes of interest (e.g., attitudes 
about democracy or gender equality). For instance, the overall proportion of missing data for 
support for democracy in cross-national surveys in the Arab world are shown in Figure 3. 
More than half of surveys have 10% or fewer cases missing for this question. But over 20% 
of observations are missing in some Tunisian, Saudi Arabian, Iraqi, and Algerian surveys; 
36% of responses are missing in Morocco in 2011 and 30% in 2005.  
There are many possible reasons why the proportion missing varies across time and 
between the WVS and the Regional Barometers; these include increasing or decreasing 
political tension (such as the Arab spring) and improvements in survey capacity. While there 
is no standard for how much missing data is acceptable, high levels can generally be 
addressed with improved monitoring and interviewer training, including training on 
standardized survey interviewing techniques (i.e., probing non-response and giving 
feedback).  
[Figure 3]  
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Figure 3. Mean support for democracy and proportion missing 
 
   
Figure 3 shows mean and proportion of responses missing: “Despite its problems, democracy 
is the best form of government. Strongly disagree=1-strongly agree=4.” Tessler (2016), GLD 
(2017), and TGP (2017). Data unweighted. Not asked in the Afrobarometer (2017). 
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Moreover, as shown in Figure 3, surveys conducted by different research groups find 
similar results for levels of support for democracy in all Arab countries in which surveys 
were conducted within a one-year time period, offering confidence in the data. In Libya, the 
August 2013 Transitional Governance Project (TGP) and the 2014 Arab Barometer estimated 
mean support for democracy of 2.0 on a four-point Likert scale. The 2007 Arab Barometer in 
Yemen found mean support for democracy of 2.1, while a year earlier the WVS estimated 
2.2. The 2006 Arab Barometer estimated mean support of 2.5 in Morocco, while a year 
earlier, the National Science Foundation survey estimated 2.3 (Tessler 2016). The 2014 GLD 
survey estimated a mean of 2.0 in Jordan, shortly after the Arab Barometer found a mean of 
2.1. Public opinion can shift over the course of a year, but these comparisons are 
encouraging, given the myriad of systematic and unsystematic errors that can affect survey 
estimates. 
When asking about another topic—whether men make better political leaders—levels 
of item-missing data in the WVS are similar in the Arab world and other regions: Sub-
Saharan Africa (4%), West Asia (5%), North and South America (5%), Europe (6%), East 
Asia (7%), and Oceania (8%). In the Arab world, only 4% of the responses are missing, but 
rates are high in two Moroccan waves (17%; Appendix Table A4).x   
The same is true of the Regional Barometers (Appendix Table A5). On average, 1% 
of responses to the question “Men make better political leaders” are missing in the 
Afrobarometer (2017), 2% are missing in the Arab Barometer (2017), and 5% are missing in 
the Latinobarometer (2017).  
Systematically Missing Data 
 Item-missing data is also systematically related to respondent sex, education, and 
religious practice in a large number of countries in the WVS (Appendix Table A4). For 
instance, in the 212 World Values Surveys (2017) that have been conducted worldwide, 
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missing data is systematically related to respondent gender in 48 surveys (23%), education in 
81 surveys (38%), and religiosity in 54 (25%).   
Most often, data is missing for women and less educated respondents in surveys 
worldwide. But, data are no more likely to be systematically missing in the Arab world than 
in other regions. About half of the surveys in any given region have systematically missing 
data related to respondent sex, education level, or religiosity. In East Asia, 47% of surveys 
have systematically missing data for at least one variable (i.e., sex, education, or religiosity). 
In Oceania, 50% of surveys have systematically missing data for at least one of the three 
respondent variables, compared to South America (53%), Sub-Saharan Africa (53%), West 
Asia (57%), Middle East (57%), North America (59%), and Europe (65%).  
There is also variation within the Arab world in terms of the extent to which missing 
data is systematically related to these variables. In the Levant (e.g., Jordan, Palestine, and 
Iraq), which have a long experience of survey research, only 25% of surveys have 
systematically missing data for one or more of these respondent variables, compared to 70% 
of surveys in North Africa and 80% in the Gulf.  
The extent of systematically missing data worldwide—and, the higher rate in the Gulf 
and North Africa—underscore the need for methodological research worldwide to understand 
the survey interaction and address potential bias. But the analysis offers little evidence that 
the Arab world is exceptional with regard to systematically missing data.  
  Ethical Issues 
In addition, use of CAPI, which has been shown to improve data quality by reducing 
data recording errors, especially with skip patterns and randomization (Benstead et al. 2017; 
Caeyers, Chalmers, and De Weerdt 2012; Bush and Prather 2017), is also increasing. Unlike 
standard paper and pencil interviewing (PAPI), where the interviewer records responses on 
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paper and manually codes them into a computer, interviewers using CAPI record answers 
onto a digital device. 
Although CAPI has important benefits for reducing error, they must be weighed 
against potential risks to participants posed by the tablets’ GPS function, especially in 
authoritarian regimes. For instance, in any setting, but especially in unfree countries, 
recording GPS location in order to measure neighbourhood effects, locate sampling units, or 
take photos of streets or housing units to measure socio-economic status, could expose 
participants to risk should electronic files be obtained by authorities or data released with 
identifying information. Even though no such breaches of participant anonymity or 
confidentially are known, it is important to be cognizant of heightened risks presented by 
CAPI. It is also important to be aware that similar risks exist in PAPI, in that some survey 
firms record personal information on survey paper forms in order to monitor interviewers and 
sampling, and thus PAPI could also put confidentiality at risk. When identifying information 
is captured in the form of a GPS location, it may be more easily copied, intercepted, or 
released without the researchers’ or respondents’ knowledge than when paper copies are used 
and destroyed, following human subject’s protocols. Accordingly, the necessity of recording 
and downloading identifiable information should be carefully assessed in human subject 
protocols and avoided when possible. 
To address confidentiality concerns, CAPI users can disable GPS or view it to verify 
that the unit is in the correct sampling area, but not record the location on the device. If GPS 
location is recorded, the added benefit versus risk must be established through human 
subjects’ protocols. Researchers can also consider using two practices to protect research 
subjects. First, they should download the data without GPS coordinates, unless it needed for a 
specific research or monitoring reason. Files containing GPS coordinates should be handled 
and safeguarded only by members of the research. Second, researchers can use applications 
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such as CS Pro, which allow data to be accessed by the study team but no others. In contrast, 
data stored by many commercially-available programs like SurveyToGo may be accessed by 
non-study members, such as those who manage data storage. Other best practices include 
bolstering content about respondents’ rights in introductory scripts (e.g., emphasizing that 
participation is voluntary), removing GPS location before data release, and specifying in 
survey provider agreements that governments cannot access data before files are anonymized. 
In collaboration with investigators, repository managers should ensure that deposited files 
contain no identifiable information. 
Conclusions: Toward a New Watershed? 
This article highlights the strides survey researchers have made in the Arab world 
during the past few decades. Researchers continue to improve training and monitoring.  
Increasingly, they add sampling weights to correct for higher refusal rates among less 
educated citizens. Yet, the preceding analysis shows that bias arising from preference 
falsification is likely in authoritarian and transitional environments in the Arab world, as well 
as in other regions and regime types. Rather than discount surveys from the Arab world or 
any other region, scholars should conduct more methodological studies to better understand 
the data collection process and address bias.  
Tunisia—with its free political context—provides a particularly useful context to 
investigate a full range of political science research questions and design and implement 
methodological research. In this sense, the Arab spring is a watershed. And, as the number of 
Arab countries in cross-national surveys increases, there is new promise to advance 
understanding of important theoretical and policy questions. 
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Tables (Main Text) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optional Appendix 
 
Table A1. Public opinion data sources (Arab world) 
 
Publicly-available data from Arab countries: 
 
Arab Barometer: http://www.arabbarometer.org/ 
 
World Values Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp 
 
Afrobarometer: http://www.afrobarometer.org/ 
 
ICPSR: https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/landing.jsp (see in particular Carnegie Middle 
East Governance and Islam Dataset, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/32302, which includes individual-level 
and country-level variables for surveys conducted by Mark Tessler and collaborates since 
1988). 
 
Pew Research Center has conducted surveys since 2001 in Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Egypt, and Kuwait. Available online at http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/ 
 
 
Other survey-related websites: 
 
Transitional Governance Project: http://transitionalgovernanceproject.org/ 
 
Program on Governance and Local Development: http://campuspress.yale.edu/pgld/ and 
http://gld.gu.se/ 
 
 
Research centers and institutes: 
 
The Social & Economic Survey Research Institute: http://sesri.qu.edu.qa/ (Qatar) 
 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research: http://www.pcpsr.org/ (Palestine) 
 
Center for Strategic Studies, http://www.jcss.org/DefaultAr.aspx (Jordan) 
 
A number of non- and for-profit marketing and survey firms and research groups in the 
region also conduct surveys. 
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Table A2. Sources for Figure 2 (Papers presented at MESA and APSA) 
Figure 2 (left) is based on abstracts found at: 
https://mesana.org/mymesa/meeting_program.php 
 
Figure 3 (right) is based on paper and poster titles found at:  
 
2016: 
http://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/annualmeeting/2016/2016%20APSA%20Final%20Progra
m.pdf?ver=2016-08-16-123936-850 
 
2015: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=1896
371&Network=no&lim=false 
 
2014: 
http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Programs/FinalePDFFullProgramAPSA2014.pdf 
 
2013: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?npage=2&form_name=journalbrowse&journa
l_id=2282083&Network=no&SortOrder=ab_approval_date&stype=desc&lim=false&selecte
dOption=6 
 
2012: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=2078
735&Network=no&lim=false 
 
2011: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=1896
371&Network=no&lim=false 
 
2010: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?npage=1&form_name=journalbrowse&journa
l_id=1621378&Network=no&SortOrder=ab_approval_date&stype=desc&lim=false&selecte
dOption=6 
 
2009: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_id=1444
480&Network=no&lim=false 
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New Directions in Theoretical and Policy Research 
 Despite the recent growth in publicly available data, existing public opinion literature 
focuses on a few topics, leaving many other questions underexplored. (See Table A3; 
Benstead 2017). The most studied topic is support for democracy (Tessler 2002a, b; Tessler, 
Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Gao 2005; Tezcür et al. 2012; Ciftci 2013; Tessler, 
Moaddel, and Inglehart 2006; Benstead 2015).xi Attitudes toward gender equality and social 
trust have also received coverage. However, much less work has explored cross-national 
differences in political values, including why citizens are more or less accepting of political 
competition or desire different constitutional rights and freedoms. 
 Many projects also shed light on the gender gap in civil society participation (Bernick 
and Ciftci 2015) or examine political participation, especially as it relates to the relationships 
between civil society membership, social trust, and support for democracy (Jamal 2007a, b). 
Some research has examined boycotting (Benstead and Reif 2017). However, limited 
research examines voter choice—such as why voters support Islamist, secular, or other 
parties—and media consumption (Pellicer and Wegner 2015). 
 Researchers have used the Arab Barometer and other surveys to examine citizens’ 
experiences with the state. For instance, some literature examines how perceptions of 
government performance and experiences with corruption and clientelism shape support for 
democracy (Benstead and Atkeson 2011). A limited number of studies also assess the extent 
to which women and minorities are able to access services from elected officials (Abdel-
Samad and Benstead 2016; Benstead 2015, 2016). At the same time, there is still a need to 
understand how clientelism and corruption affect citizens’ interpersonal trust and confidence 
in state institutions and how these outcomes affect demand for freer elections. 
 Some studies also examine values and identity, with most focusing on gender equality 
(Alexander and Welzel 2011; Norris 2009) and identity (Benstead and Reif 2013). Yet, few 
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explain social and political values, including tolerance, religiosity, and attitudes toward 
controversial issues, such as dress choice, minorities’ political rights, and state violations of 
human rights in the name of security. 
Attitudes about international and regional issues have also been the subject of some 
studies (Tessler and Robbins 2007), but despite their timeliness, much more work should be 
done on attitudes toward other international issues and bodies like the Arab League and the 
United Nations. Research might also explore how citizens explain the Arab world’s economic 
and political challenges, their perceptions of the motivations for and effectiveness of US 
democracy promotion, the extent to which citizens support a two-state solution in Israel and 
Palestine, and the impact of living in western countries on attitudes. 
 
 
Table A3. Topics in the Arab Barometer  
a. Topics and literature b. Theoretical and policy questions 
Attitudes toward political regimes 
Preferences for political 
regimes (Tessler 2002a, 
b; Tessler, Jamal and 
Robbins 2012; Tessler 
and Gao 2005; Tezcür et 
al. 2012; Ciftci 2013; 
Benstead 2015; Al-Ississ 
and Diwan 2016) 
Why does support for democracy develop and change? Why do 
citizens define democracy differently? Why do citizens 
demand secular versus religious democracy? Why are some 
political and economic reforms likely to be more effective than 
others for strengthening support for democracy? 
Political values 
(Hoffman and Jamal 
2012) 
Why are some citizens more supportive of greater political 
competition and debate? How do youth values differ from 
those of older generations? 
Political participation 
Civil society 
membership, political 
knowledge, and 
engagement (Jamal 
2007a, b; Bernick and 
Ciftci 2015; Hamanaka 
2017; Robbins and Jamal 
2016) 
How does civic participation relate to trust, government 
legitimacy, and support for democracy? What explains 
participation in campaign rallies, petitions, and protests, 
including gender gaps in these forms of engagement? Why do 
gender gaps exist in political knowledge and how does this 
impact participation? How do citizens perceive the reasons for 
the Arab spring and the extent to which they were achieved? 
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Voting Why do voters support Islamist, secular, or other parties and 
what explains why some voters switch their support in 
subsequent elections? What is the extent and impact of 
votebuying and clientelism? Are men or women more or less 
likely to sell their vote or to vote based on clientelistic 
relationships? 
Political knowledge and 
the media 
Who consumes various media sources and how does this 
choice impact values and partisanship? 
Citizen engagement with the state and social institutions 
Institutional trust and 
perceptions of 
government performance 
(Benstead and Atkeson 
2011) 
Why do some citizens evaluate government performance more 
positively than others? To what extent do citizens see their 
governments as democratic? Why do evaluations of 
government performance change over time? How does 
clientelism and corruption affect social trust, regime 
legitimacy, and support for democracy? 
Governance and service 
provision. State-society 
linkages and 
representation (Abdel-
Samad and Benstead 
2016) 
 
What explains effectiveness and equity in access to services, 
such as security, dispute resolution, healthcare, and education?  
 
Individual orientations and identity 
Gender equality 
(Alexander and Welzel 
2011; Norris 2009; Al 
Subhi and Smith 
Forthcoming) 
What explains attitudes toward different dimensions of gender 
inequality, such as women’s status, mobility, wages, and 
political involvement?  
 
Identity (Benstead and 
Reif 2013) 
How does identity shape culture and political attitudes?  
Tolerance and values 
(Falco and Rotondi 
2016.) 
Why are some citizens more supportive of greater political 
competition and debate? Citizens are more likely to wish to 
migrate? How does living in western countries impact social 
and political attitudes? 
Religiosity and 
interpretations of Islam 
(Achilov 2016) 
Why does religiosity vary within and across societies? What 
are individuals’ views on matters such as lotteries, women’s 
dress, apostasy, Islam and democracy, and minority political 
rights?  
Controversial issues To what extent does the public accept state violations of 
security to achieve security? 
International affairs 
Attitudes about 
international and regional 
issues (Nugent, Masoud, 
To what extent do citizens see foreign countries like Iran and 
the US as democratic? How do they evaluate the Arab League 
and other international organizations? Why do citizens assess 
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and Jamal 2016; Tessler 
and Robbins 2007; 
Benstead and Reif 2017; 
Tessler and Warriner 
1997; Tessler, Jamal and 
Robbins 2012; Tessler, 
Moaddel and Inglehart 
2006; Isani and 
Schlipphak 2016; Tausch 
2016) 
differently the reasons for economic and political challenges in 
the Arab world? Do citizens support armed operations against 
US elsewhere? Why do anti- and pro- American attitudes vary 
across the Arab world? To what extent do citizens support a 
two state solution in Israel/Palestine?  
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Table A4. Percentage of observations missing and systematically missing data for 
respondent sex, education, and religiosity for “Men make better political leaders” 
(World Values Survey) 
Country-
year 
a. % 
missing 
b. Higher % missing 
(p<.05) 
b. Country-
year 
a. % 
missing 
b. Higher % missing 
(p<.05) 
China-1995 8.0 
Less educated West Asia-
con’t  
 
China-2001 7.0 
Female, less educated  Kyrgyzstan-
2011 0.5 
 
China-2007 16.0 
Female, less educated, 
more religious 
Pakistan-
1997 0.0 
 
China-2012 10.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Pakistan-
2001 2.0 
Female 
Taiwan-1994 6.0 
Less educated Pakistan-
2012 3.0 
Female 
Taiwan-2006 0.5 
 Turkey-
1996 5.0 
Female, less educated 
Taiwan-2012 6.0 
Less educated Turkey-
2001 3.0 
 
Hong Kong-
2005 3.0 
 Turkey-
2007 4.0 
Less educated 
Hong Kong-
2013 0.6 
 Turkey-
2011 3.0 
 
Indonesia-
2001 5.0 
Less educated, less 
religious 
Uzbekistan-
2011 2.0 
Female, less educated 
Indonesia-
2006 3.0 
Less educated, less 
religious 
Mean-West 
Asia 4.6 
13/23 (57%) 
Japan-1995 28.0     
Japan-2000 30.0 
 Bahrain-
2014 4.0 
 
Japan-2005 32.0 
 Kuwait-
2014 4.0 
Female 
Japan-2010 35.0  Qatar-2010 0.3 Less educated 
South Korea-
1996 0.2 
 Saudi 
Arabia-2003 5.0 
More religious 
South Korea-
2001 9.0 
More educated Yemen-
2014 3.0 
Female, Less religious 
South Korea-
2005 0.0 
Less religious Mean-Gulf 3.3 4/5 (80%) 
South Korea-
2010 1.0 
Male 
  
 
Malaysia-
2006 0.4 
 Palestine-
2013 2.0 
 
Malaysia-
2012 0.0 
 
Iraq-2004 3.0 
 
Philippines-
1996 2.0 
More educated 
Iraq-2006 3.0 
Female 
Philippines-
2001 1.0 
 
Iraq-2012 2.0 
Less religious 
Philippines-
2012 0.0 
 
Jordan-2001 2.0 
 
Singapore-
2002 2.0 
 
Jordan-2007 2.0 
 
Singapore-
2012 0.0 
 
Jordan-2014 2.0 
 
Viet Nam-
2001 6.0 
Female, less educated Lebanon-
2013 3.0 
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Viet Nam-
2006 2.0 
Female, more religious Mean-
Levant 
2.4 2/8 (25%) 
Thailand-
2007 0.5 
 
  
 
Thailand-
2013 0.7 
 Algeria-
2000 6.0 
Less educated 
Mean-East 
Asia 7.2 
14/30 (47%) Algeria-
2013 4.0 
 
   Libya-2014 3.0 Female 
Albania-1998 8.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Morocco-
2001 17.0 
Female, less educated 
Albania-2002 8.0 
 Morocco-
2007 7.0 
More religious 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina-
2001 2.0 
More religious 
Morocco-
2011 17.0 
Female 
Andorra-2005 2.0 
 Tunisia-
2013 4.0 
Female 
Bulgaria-
1997 16.0 
Less educated, more 
religious Egypt-2001 0.5 
 
Bulgaria-
2005 7.0 
Less educated 
Egypt-2008 0.2 
Less religious 
Belarus-1990 8.0 Female, less educated Egypt-2013 0.0  
Belarus-1996 1.0 
Less educated Mean-
North 
Africa 5.9 
7/10 (70%) 
Croatia-1996 5.0 
 Mean-All 
Middle East 
4.1 13/23 (57%) 
Cyprus-2006 0.2     
Cyprus-2011 2.0 
 Canada-
2000 4.0 
Less religious 
Czech 
Republic-
1998 8.0 
 
Canada-
2006 4.0 
More religious 
Estonia-1996 4.0 
 Dominican 
Republic-
1996 12.0 
 
Estonia-2011 3.0 
 El Salvador-
1999 8.0 
Female, less educated 
Finland-1996 4.0 
 Guatemala-
2004 3.0 
 
Finland-2005 2.0     
France-2006 3.0 
 Mexico-
1996 8.0 
Less educated 
Germany-
1997 4.0 
 Mexico-
2000 4.0 
Female, less educated 
Germany-
2006 6.0 
Male Mexico-
2005 1.0 
Less educated 
Germany-
2013 3.0 
 Mexico-
2012 1.0 
 
Hungary-
1990 6.0 
Less educated Puerto Rico-
1995 4.0 
Less educated 
Hungary-
2009 4.0 
Less educated Puerto Rico-
2001 4.0 
Less educated, less 
religious 
Italy-2005 7.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Trinidad and 
Tobago-
2006 6.0 
Male 
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Latvia-1996 8.0 
 Trinidad and 
Tobago-
2011 10.0 
 
Lithuania-
1997 10.0 
Male, less educated 
U.S.-1995 7.0 
 
Moldova-
1996 6.0 
Less educated, more 
religious U.S.-1999 5.0 
 
Moldova-
2002 8.0 
Female, less educated 
U.S.-2006 2.0 
Less educated 
Moldova-
2006 3.0 
More religious 
U.S.-2011 1.0 
 
Netherlands-
2006 7.0 
Male Mean-
North 
America 
5.3 10/17 (59%) 
Netherlands-
2012 12.0 
Less educated 
  
 
Norway-1996 1.0 
 Australia-
1995 4.0 
 
Norway-2007 0.4 
 Australia-
2005 2.0 
 
Poland-1997 16.0 
Less educated Australia-
2012 3.0 
 
Poland-2005 11.0 
Less educated New 
Zealand-
1998 15.0 
Male 
Poland-2012 11.0 
Less educated New 
Zealand-
2004 13.0 
Male 
Romania-
1998 12.0 
Less educated New 
Zealand-
2011 11.0 
Male, less educated 
Romania-
2005 10.0 
Female, less educated Mean-
Oceania 8.0 
3/6 (50%) 
Romania-
2012 9.0 
Female, less educated 
  
 
Russian 
Federation-
1995 10.0 
Female, less educated, 
more religious Uruguay-
1996 8.0 
Less educated 
Russian 
Federation-
2006 6.0 
 
Uruguay-
2006 10.0 
 
Russian 
Federation-
2011 5.0 
Less educated 
Uruguay-
2011 9.0 
 
Slovakia-
1998 7.0 
Less educated Argentina-
1995 9.0 
Less educated 
Slovenia-
1995 7.0 
Less educated Argentina-
1999 10.0 
Less educated 
Slovenia-
2005 6.0 
More religious Argentina-
2006 10.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Slovenia-
2011 4.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Argentina-
2013 5.0 
Male 
Spain-1995 8.0 
Less educated, more 
religious Brazil-2006 1.0 
Less educated 
Spain-2000 8.0 More religious Brazil-2014 4.0 Female 
Spain-2007 5.0 Less educated Chile-1996 6.0 More educated 
Spain-2011 4.0 
Less educated, more 
religious Chile-2000 4.0 
 
Sweden-1996 6.0 Male Chile-2006 4.0  
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Sweden-2006 1.0  Chile-2011 4.0  
Sweden-2011 4.0 
Male Colombia-
1998 3.0 
Less educated 
Switzerland-
2007 2.0 
Less educated, less 
religious 
Colombia-
2005 0.1 
 
Ukraine-1996 16.0 
Less educated Colombia-
2012 4.0 
Less educated 
Ukraine-2006 8.0 
 Ecuador-
2013 0.3 
 
Ukraine-2011 0.0 
 
Peru-1996 6.0 
Less educated, more 
religious 
Macedonia-
1998 8.0 
Less educated, more 
religious Peru-2001 4.0 
 
Macedonia-
2001 4.0 
Less educated 
Peru-2006 3.0 
Less educated 
Great Britain-
2005 10.0 
Less educated 
Peru-2012 6.0 
 
Serbia and 
Montenegro-
2005 5.0 
 
Venezuela-
1996 9.0 
 
Serbia-1996 8.0 
Less educated Venezuela-
2000 3.0 
Female, less educated, 
more religious 
Serbia-2001 12.0 
Female, less educated Mean-
South 
America 5.3 
13/23 (57%) 
Montenegro-
1996 13.0 
 
  
 
Montenegro-
2001 13.0 
 Ethiopia-
2007 2.0 
 
Bosnia-1998 4.0  Ghana-2007 3.0 Female 
Georgia-1996 3.0 Less educated Ghana-2012 0.0  
Georgia-2009 6.0 Less religious Mali-2007 5.0  
Georgia-2014 5.0 
Less educated Nigeria-
1995 4.0 
Female, less educated 
Mean-
Europe 6.4 
44/68 (65%) Nigeria-
2000 2.0 
Female 
  
 Nigeria-
2011 0.0 
 
Azerbaijan-
1997 6.0 
Less educated Rwanda-
2007 6.0 
Female, Less religiosity 
Azerbaijan-
2011 0.3 
 Rwanda-
2012 0.0 
 
Bangladesh-
1996 9.0 
Female, less educated South 
Africa-1996 10.0 
Female, less educated 
Bangladesh-
2002 2.0 
 South 
Africa-2001 8.0 
Less educated 
Armenia-
1997 5.0 
Female South 
Africa-2006 5.0 
Less educated 
Armenia-
2001 3.0 
 South 
Africa-2013 4.0 
Less educated 
India-1995 15.0 
Female, less educated, 
more religious 
Zimbabwe-
2001 6.0 
Less educated 
India-2001 14.0 
Female, less educated, 
less religious 
Zimbabwe-
2012 0.0 
 
India-2006 16.0 
Female, less educated, 
more religious 
Uganda-
2001 2.0 
 
India-2014 0.4 
 Tanzania-
2001 2.0 
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Iran-2000 11.0 
Female, less educated Burkina 
Faso-2007 8.0 
Female, more religious 
Iran-2007 0.8 
Female Zambia-
2007 3.0 
 
Kazakhstan-
2011 0.0 
 Mean-Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 3.7 
10/19 (53%) 
Kyrgyzstan-
2003 1.0 
 Al 
Countries 5.6 
 
Table A4 (a columns) shows the proportion missing in a given survey and for all surveys in a 
region for the item: “Men make better political leaders. Strongly disagree=1-strongly 
agree=4.” WVS (2017). Data unweighted. B column shows instances in which missing data 
is significantly more likely to be missing a respondent sex, education level, and/or level of 
religious observance. Education: Lower, middle, upper education. Religiosity: “How often do 
you attend religious services?” More than once a week(=1), once a week(=1), once a 
month(=2), only on special days(=2), only specific holidays(=2), once a year(=2), less 
often(=3), never/practically never(=3). 
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Table A5. Percentage of observations missing for “Men make better political leaders” 
(Regional Barometers) 
 
Country-year % missing Country-year % missing 
Argentina-2009 5.0 Afrobarometer-con’t  
Bolivia-2009 5.0 Namibia-2005 0.3 
Brazil-2009 2.0 Nigeria-2005 0.4 
Chile-2009 4.0 Senegal-2005 1.0 
Colombia-2009 4.0 South Africa-2005 1.0 
Costa Rica-2009 4.0 Tanzania-2005 0.4 
Dominican Republic-2009 2.0 Uganda-2005 0.0 
Ecuador-2009 5.0 Zambia-2005 0.7 
El Salvador-2009 3.0 Zimbabwe-2005 0.3 
Guatemala-2009 3.0 Benin-2015 0.0 
Honduras-2009 8.0 Botswana-2015 1.0 
Mexico-2009 4.0 Burkina Faso-2015 2.0 
Nicaragua-2009 8.0 Cape Verde-2015 1.0 
Panama-2009 6.0 Ghana-2015 0.2 
Paraguay-2009 2.0 Kenya-2015 1.0 
Peru -2009 6.0 Lesotho-2015 1.0 
Spain-2009 6.0 Liberia-2015 1.0 
Uruguay-2009 7.0 Madagascar-2015 7.0 
Venezuela-2009 4.0 Malawi-2015 1.0 
Argentina-2004 4.0 Mali-2015 0.3 
Bolivia-2004 7.0 Mozambique-2015 4.0 
Brazil-2004 5.0 Namibia-2015 0.2 
Chile-2004 5.0 Nigeria-2015 0.3 
Colombia-2004 4.0 Senegal-2015 0.3 
Costa Rica-2004 7.0 South Africa-2015 1.0 
Dominican Republic-2004 4.0 Tanzania-2015 0.2 
Ecuador-2004 2.0 Uganda-2015 0.3 
El Salvador-2004 8.0 Zambia-2015 0.2 
Guatemala-2004 6.0 Zimbabwe-2015 0.3 
Honduras-2004 3.0 Mauritius-2015 1.0 
Mexico-2004 2.0 Sierra Leone-2015 1.0 
Nicaragua-2004 6.0 Niger-2015 1.0 
Panama-2004 3.0 Togo-2015 1.0 
Paraguay-2004 4.0 Burundi-2015 0.3 
Peru-2004 4.0 Cameroon-2015 3.0 
Uruguay-2004 7.0 Ivory Coast-2015 1.0 
Venezuela-2004 5.0 Guinea-2015 0.3 
Mean missing-Latin Barometer 4.7 Swaziland-2015 0.3 
  Algeria-2015 2.0 
Tunisia-2013 2.7 Egypt-2015 3.0 
Tunisia-2011 3.5 Morocco-2015 3.0 
Sudan-2013 1.1 Sudan-2015 2.0 
Sudan-2011 1.4 Tunisia-2015 3.0 
Saudi Arabia-2011 4.7 Algeria-2016 3.0 
Egypt-2013 1.9 Benin-2016 0.2 
Egypt-2011 0.7 Botswana-2016 1.0 
Iraq-2013 2.8 Burkina Faso-2016 1.0 
Iraq-2011 0.6 Burundi-2016 0.6 
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Yemen-2013 0.5 Cameroon-2016 0.3 
Yemen-2010-2011 2.3 Cape Verde-2016 0.6 
Yemen-2007 4.2 Ivory Coast-2016 0.2 
Lebanon-2013 1.4 Egypt-2016 3.0 
Lebanon-2010 0.3 Gabon-2016 0.4 
Lebanon-2007 2.4 Ghana-2016 1.0 
Kuwait-2014 0.4 Guinea-2016 0.4 
Morocco-2013 3.6 Kenya-2016 2.0 
Morocco-2006 3.0 Lesotho-2016 2.0 
Algeria-2013 3.3 Liberia-2016 0.4 
Algeria-2011 4.6 Madagascar-2016 0.4 
Algeria-2006 9.0 Malawi-2016 2.0 
Palestine-2012 0.3 Mali-2016 2.0 
Palestine-2010 0.6 Mauritius-2016 1.0 
Palestine-2006 0.6 Morocco-2016 2.0 
Libya-2014 2.1 Mozambique-2016 2.0 
Jordan-2012-2013 1.3 Namibia-2016 0.3 
Jordan-2010 1.2 Niger-2016 0.3 
Jordan-2006 2.4 Nigeria-2016 2.0 
Mean missing-Arab Barometer 2.2 
Sao Tome and Principe-
2016 5.0 
  Senegal-2016 1.0 
  Sierra Leone-2016 4.0 
Benin-2005 0.1 South Africa-2016 3.0 
Botswana-2005 0.6 Sudan-2016 2.0 
Cape Verde-2005 2.0 Swaziland-2016 0.6 
Ghana-2005 0.3 Tanzania-2016 0.4 
Kenya-2005 0.3 Togo-2016 1.0 
Lesotho-2005 0.3 Tunisia-2016 1.0 
Madagascar-2005 1.0 Uganda-2016 2.0 
Malawi-2005 0.7 Zambia-2016 1.0 
Mali-2005 0.7 Zimbabwe-2016 2.0 
Mozambique-2005 3.0 
Mean missing-
Afrobarometer 1.2 
Table A5 shows proportion missing: “Men make better political leaders. Strongly 
disagree=1-strongly agree=4.” Afrobarometer (2017); Latin Barometer (2017); Arab 
Barometer (2017). Data unweighted. 
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i Glock and colleagues conducted surveys in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, and Jordan 
in 1947. The survey terrain was difficult, Iraq was abandoned in favour of Iran, and the 
resulting data did not lend itself to cross-country comparisons (Converse 1987, p. 290-291). 
ii The expansion of survey research may be due to regime members’ desire to avoid being 
singled out or to improve their image internationally. At the same time, many governments 
limit the questions that can be asked. With the exception of Tunisia and a few other countries, 
government permission is needed to conduct surveys and questions are often removed in the 
review process. Researchers self-sensor, and their ability to conduct survey may depend on 
having good relations with governments. The Gulf is less politically liberalized and least 
covered in cross-national surveys; sensitive questions are often removed. 
iii An online search results in reports of numerous face-to-face and telephone surveys by 
government and non-governmental entities in Syria and among displaced Syrians. 
iv Lust and Benstead launched the TGP (2017) to study the transitional politics of Tunisia, 
Libya, and Egypt.  
v The Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) was developed by Benstead, Landry, 
Malouche, and Lust to explain variation in education, health, and municipal service quality 
across localities by drawing large samples at the municipal level (GLD 2017). 
vi Appendix Table A3; Benstead 2017a. 
vii Concerns about the difficult survey environment, due in part to instability, are based on 
author’s experiences participating in conference discussions. 
viii Freedom House did not consider any Arab country Free until 2015, when it ranked Tunisia 
free. 
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ix Social desirability bias occurs when respondents engage in impression management, 
avoiding voicing socially unacceptable or embarrassing opinions. Conformity bias occurs 
when respondents avoid expressing opinions that differ from the interviewer’s views, based 
on stereotypes drawn from the interviewer’s race, class, gender, etc. (Sudman and Bradburn 
1974). 
x The same is true of the Regional Barometers. On average, 1.2% of responses to “Men make 
better political leaders” are missing in the Afrobarometer (2017) 2.2% are missing in the 
Arab Barometer (2017) and 4.7% in the Latinobarometer (2017). (Appendix Table A5). 
xi Early publications on Arab public opinion include Nachtwey and Tessler 2002; Tessler 
2000; Tessler and Warriner 1997. 
